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NOTES AND COMMENT
limited to its own jurisdiction. As the domicile of the father deter-
mines the law that controls, it is easy to see how inconsistencies in the
law between the states work a hardship and prevent adequate enforce-
ment and relief. With the liberalization of divorce laws, a problem of
care of unwanted children arises which is not met completely. Nor
has liability as yet been determined between brother and sister for
support.79 In commercial fields uniform law has met with evident
success, and a uniform system of family laws should be advocated.80
The tremendous advance in the recognition of the moral obligation for
support of dependent relatives, and its present enforcement by the
courts is an indication that the public will continue, wherever possible,
to remedy the weaknesses that still exist.
ROBERT M. POST.
THE BASIS OF RECOVERY FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM.
The family ways of English speaking peoples have changed
greatly since the day when a wife was regarded as nothing more than
the chattel of her husband.1 The law had always recognized a right
in the man to the exclusive possession of his wife, and any interference
with his right of property in her would enable him to sue out a writ
of trespass. The wife, on the other hand, was not recognized as a
legal entity for either of two reasons: (1) she had vested rights but
could not enforce them because of the disabilities of coverture,2 or
(2) she had no rights at all because of her inferior position in the
marriage relationship.3 Such procedural fiction served the courts
until the passage of the Enabling Acts.4 Then the problems arose as
79 Lee v. Smith, 161 Misc. 43, 291 N. Y. Supp. 47 (1936).
so Note (1908) 21 HARV. L. REv. 416, 510, 519, 583; Note (1911) 5 ILL. L.
REv. 521-544.
1 "The law of England and the United States on this topic (law of husband
and wife), has undergone a remarkable change. * * * The old common law
theory of marriage, that of unity of person and property in the husband, is so
repugnant to modern ideas that it has been almost entirely swept away. * * *"
1 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIvoRcE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th
ed. 1921) 5.
"Perhaps the characteristic of the twentieth century family that most
sharply challenges the attention of the student of family history is its instability.
It is a far cry from the closely knit, highly unified family organization of the
ancient Romans or the Middle-Age Teutons to the more loosely organized
household of modern time wherein each member tends to claim independence as
an individual with a personality to be developed and respected." GooDSE., A
HISTORY OF THE FAMILY AS A SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION (1930)
456.
2 Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889).
3 3 BL Comm. *142, 143.
4 One example of such legislation is that of New York, N. Y. Dom. REL.
LAW §§ 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 59, 60.
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to whether the husband still had a right to his wife's consortium for
the loss of which the courts would allow recovery, and whether the
wife had a reciprocal right in her husband which could now be
protected.
At common law the meaning of the word "consortium" included
society, conjugal rights, and services. 5 In any action for the loss
thereof the predominant feature may have been the loss of society and
conjugal rights 6 or it may have been the loss of services, depending
on which element was particularly interfered with; but in any event,
the loss of services was most certainly an important reason for re-
covery. " * * * there will be found few cases * * * in which the
husband's loss was regarded as one into which the element of service
did not enter. The pleadings in the early cases, and the language of
the opinions in them, clearly show that loss of service as well as so-
ciety and affection were included in the legal meaning of the loss of
'consortium'." 8 The domestic duties of the wife and her subservience
in the marriage relationship led to the recognition of the husband as
the master, having a property right in his wife, and any interference
with such right would enable him to obtain a writ of trespass. This
was the only remedy available to the husband, since no other civil
writ could be made to fit the facts and it was not until recent years
that courts of equity would entertain such suits, no right in property
being involved.9 In support of the contention that it is not a property
right is the fact that a husband, who is separated from his wife, can-
not sue for loss of consortium resulting from negligent injuries, be-
cause he has suffered no loss of her society.10 An unintentional injury
5 "Consortium is a property right growing out of the marriage relation for
loss of which recovery may be had, and it includes exclusive right to services of
spouse and also exclusive right to society, companionship, and conjugal affec-
tion." Riggs v. Smith, 52 Idaho 43, 11 P. (2d) 358 (1932).
"Originally the term 'consortium' was used to designate a right which thelaw recognized in a husband, growing out of the marital union, to have per-
formance by the wife of all duties and obligations in respect to him, which she
took on herself when she entered into it, and includes the right of society, con-jugal affection, and services." Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185
N. E. 860 (1933).
6 See Burke v. Johnson, 274 Ky. 405, 118 S. W. (2d) 731 (1938) ; Guevin
v. Manchester Ry., 78 N. H. 289, 99 Atl. 298 (1916).
7 "* * * there must be some loss of service so as to furnish a support to
the allowance of damages for loss of comfort and society, the three elements
making up the consortium * * *". Stout v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 172
Mo. App. 113, 157 S. W. 1019 (1913); Mead v. Baum, 76 N. J. L. 337, 342,
69 Atl. 962, 963 (1908) (" * * * the right to an action by the husband for an
injury to his wife rests upon the same ground as the right of a master to sue
for injuries to his servant").
8 See Marri v. Stamford St. R. R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582, 583 (1911).
9 Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899) (involving
a question of whether injunction would lie to restrain alienation of affection) ;
Hall v. Smith, 80 Misc. 85, 140 N. Y. Supp. 796 (1913) (action for alienation
of affection; court, citing favorably Ex parte Warfield, supra, assumed that
injunction would lie).20 Loughrey v. Penn. R. R., 284 Pa. 267, 131 Atl. 260 (1925).
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to one of the spouses, seemingly, does not present much of a danger
to the marital relationship, since it is not protected where the husband
and wife live apart under articles of separation or a decree of divorce,
whereas a recovery is allowed for an intentional interference with the
relationship even where the parties live apart under articles of separa-
tion. Evidently the right to consortium is not a property right but an
incident of the marital relationship which the courts will protect only
in those instances where the public policy so requires.'1
The fiction of recovery for loss of service was the basis of the
actions for alienation of affection and criminal conversation,12 although
dicta in the early cases indicate that the recovery was for loss of the
wife's affection and society.13 The true reason for allowing such ac-
tions was the desire of the courts to save inviolate the marriage rela-
tionship and its sentimental elements which make for a congenial fam-
ily life and the procreation of children, and so, the perpetuation of the
state.' 4  So important was the right of a husband to the conjugal
society of his wife that its protection was extended to cases where the
loss was the unintentional result of negligent injuries.15 Here again
the fiction of loss of service enabled the courts to reason to a recovery
in terms of money. The loss of valuable services was something which
could be measured in terms of compensatory damages, while the loss
of conjugal affection and society was compensated for as an aggrava-
tion of the injury.
Since the enactment of the Enabling Acts there has been a de-
cided division of authority as to whether a husband may maintain an
independent action for the loss of his wife's consortium. An increas-
ingly strong minority contends that the meaning of the word
"consortium" has undergone a radical change, so that it no longer in-
cludes the element of service. 16 This conclusion is reached on the
theory that the Enabling Acts have, in effect, taken away from the
husband the right to his wife's services. It is argued that the husband
now has only his right to the conjugal affection and society of his wife.
This right, while it is sufficient to support an action for intentional
interference therewith, on the ground of public policy, is not enough
11 See Colwell v. Tinker, 169 N. Y. 531, 536, 62 N. E. 668, 670 (1902).
12 See note 5, supra.
'3 See Marri v. Stamford St. R. R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 AtI. 582, 583 (1911);
Smith v. Nicholas Building Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204, 205 (1915).
'1 See Colwell v. Tinker, 169 N. Y. 531, 536, 62 N. E. 668, 670 (1902),
supra note 11.
IG "Since Blackstone's day there has been an extension of the common law
right of a husband to recover for loss of consortium to cases in which the
personal injury sustained by the wife was the result of negligence, so that it is
generally held that it makes no difference whether the injury is intentionally or
negligently inflicted." Marri v. Stamford St. R. R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 At. 582,
585 (1911).
16 Marri v. Stamford St. R. R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 AtI. 582 (1911) ; Feneff v.
N. Y. C. & H. P_ R_, 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436 (1909); Bolger v. Boston
El. Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N. E. 389 (1910); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co.,
184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724 (1915).
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to maintain an independent action where the interference is uninten-
tional. Although the courts do put a pecuniary value upon the right
in an action for alienation of affection, it is to punish and not to com-
pensate.17 The excessiveness of the damages awarded would seem to
indicate that they were punitive rather than compensatory. The hus-
band, having lost the exclusive right to the conjugal affection of his
wife, had to be prevented from wreaking his vengeance on the wrong-
doers to atone for the great wrong to his honor; and drastic measures
were taken to preserve the family. The same reason (the protection
of the exclusive right of the husband to the conjugal love of his wife)
prompted the courts to extend the right to sue for the loss thereof
where the wife was negligently injured. Here, however, there could
be no punishment, the injury being unintentional, and the court would,
under our rule of damages, be incapable of measuring in terms of
money the actual compensatory value of such. sentimental rights.1 8
At first glance it would seem that these jurists had failed to realize
that the legislature could never have intended to relieve the wife of
the duty of rendering domestic services. Such independence would
tend to destroy the marriage relationship, and "The bond of marriage
being loosened, posterity degenerates, society goes headlong; and the
floodgates of licentiousness once fully opened, the hand must be strong
that can close them again." 19 They do not, however, lose sight of
the right of the husband to have performance of the wifely services,
so invaluable to domestic happiness, but contend, on the other band,
that the ordinary rule of damages allows pecuniary compensation only
for the impairment or injury directly done.20  If the husband has in
fact, on account of his wife's injury, lost a service which she habitu-
ally rendered, then, as service, and according to the pecuniary value
of it, he ought to be permitted to recover. Recovery should be ac-
cording to the fact.21
The weight of authority, today, is still in favor of allowing re-
covery for loss of consortium (conjugal affection and society),
whether the loss be the result of an intentional or unintentional inter-
ference. Under the guise of discarding the old fictions, new ones have
been created and the old ones have been refurbished; so that, as
reasons for allowing recovery we find the desire to insure the health
and cleanliness of the husband and offspring, and that it is "archaic"
to say the husband has a right to the personal enjoyment of his wife
17 "It (the law) does recognize invasion by willful misconduct. It inflicts
heavy damages upon the enticer or seducer. But this for punishment and
atonement rather than compensation. It comes within the range of concurrent
and supplementary adjuncts to the criminal law for the prevention and redress
of wrongs." Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 337, 63 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1900).
Is Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724 (1915),
supra note 16.
19 1 SCHOULER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 14.2 0 Feneff v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436 (1909).
21 Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724 (1915),
supra note 16.
[ VOL.. 14
NOTES AND COMMENT
and a property interest in her body, unless the wife is given the same
interest in her husband.22  In actions for loss of services, where the
wife was negligently injured, recovery is allowed on the ground that
the husband never did have to prove the value of his wife's services,
but that the jury, from their own observation and experience, could
determine what was an adequate compensation for the technical loss
of service.23 One very recent and startling example of the confusion
caused by these legal fictions is the case of Rademacher v. Torbensen.24
The New York Supreme Court allowed the husband to recover in
an action founded on negligence for loss of service and medical ex-
penses for the care of his wife's injuries, incurred two months before
the marriage. The court evidently felt that the husband, being duty-
bound to care for his wife, was in fact entitled to recover for medical
expenses; but there could be no such recovery unless the husband had,
at the same time, a right to the service of the wife.25 Such result
certainly was unauthorized, for there is extensive authority to the
effect that a husband cannot recover against one who commits a tort
on the wife, prior to the marriage, while plaintiff was engaged to
marry her; 26 and in the Rademacher case there was no evidence that
the plaintiff was even engaged at the time of the injury to his wife.
When the case was later reversed, the Appellate Division did not
allow recovery for medical expenses. 27
The wife, at common law, had no right to sue for any interfer-
ence with her marital interests. Some legal writers even deny that
the wife had any rights in the marriage relationship. The absence
of cases on the subject leave it to conjecture whether the wife had such
rights but could not exercise them because of her legal disability or
whether, because of her inferiority in the marriage relationship, the
law would not recognize such right in her.28 The existence of the
right in the wife must have been recognized, or else, when the wife
was personally injured, whether before or after inarriage, the cause
of action would not abate upon her death or survive to her upon the
death of her husband. So reasoned the New York Court of Appeals 2 9
when, in the light of the Enabling Acts, it granted to a plaintiff wife
the right to recover for the alienation of her husband's affection. This
was in accord with what was said in the English case of Lynch v.
22 Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. 156, 140 N. E. 227 (1923).
23 Reeves v. Lutz, 179 Mo. App. 61, 162 S. W. 280 (1914).
24 169 Misc. 1030, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 162 (1938), rev'd, 257 App. Div. 91,
13 N. Y. S. (2d) 124 (4th Dept. 1939).
25 Contra: Marri v. Stamford St. R. R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911)
(recovery for medical expenses granted, where recovery for loss of services
denied) ; Bolger v. Boston El. Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N. E. 389 (1910).
26 Buchanan v. W. Jersey R. R., 52 N. J. L. 264, 19 At. 254 (1890) ; Mead
v. Baum, 76 N. J. L. 337, 69 Atl. 962 (1908) ; Booth v. Baltimore & 0. R. R.,
77 W. Va. 100, 87 S. E. 84 (1915).
27 Rademacher v. Torbensen, 257 App. Div. 91, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 124 (4th
Dept. 1939).
28 3 BL- Comm. *142, 143.
29 Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889).
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Knight 30 which recognized a legal right in the wife to her husband's
consortium, the dicta in that case having been followed in almost
every jurisdiction in the United States.3 1 The courts have recognized
that the legal right to consortium is one which is mutual to both hus-
band and wife, and since both now have equal rights and remedies,
either can sue to punish for any intentional interference with the
right.3 2
The wife, having been granted the right to recover in actions
for alienation of affection and criminal conversation,3 3 on a par with
the husband, was still to be denied the right to recover for loss of
consortium where it was unintentionally caused. The fiction which
today supports a husband's recovery in such actions, namely, that he
is recovering for the valuable domestic services of his wife and as
aggravation for the loss of conjugal society, tends to defeat a cause of
action by the wife.3 4  She has no right to any of the services of the
husband, except in the sense that he is bound to support her, and
since the right of action is predicated on the loss of service she has
no remedy. Such result is indeed inconsistent with what the courts
say. "We recognize that the so-called sentimental elements of con-
sortium are substantial and vital factors in producing and sustaining
the union with respect to the husband, including his right to receive
the wife's services about the household and her assistance in the care
of the children." 35 "It is to be said also that a wife has the same
legal right in respect to the society and assistance of her husband, for
these are rights, duties and obligations which by marriage both the
husband and wife receive and take upon themselves, limited, however,
in this state to cases where such loss is due to an intentional wrong
or a direct attack on the marriage relation." 30 In other jurisdictions
which come to the same conclusion the prevailing view is also that
the wife's right to the companionship and society of her husband is
on the same legal standing as the right of the husband to her society
and should be afforded the same protection.3 7 It is contended, how-
308 Eng. Rul. Cas. 382, 9 H. L. Cas. 577 (1861).
31 A remedy was consistently denied the wife in Maine and Wisconsin until
legislation was enacted which gave her the right to sue. ME. REv. STAT. (1930)
c. 74, § 7; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 246.07.
32 Jaynes v. Jaynes, 39 Hun 40 (N. Y. 1886).
However, the mere fact that the injury was intentionally inflicted may not
be sufficient to allow the wife to recover. In Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205
Ind. 59, 185 N. E. 860 (1933), where the defendant's servant intentionally ran
an automobile against plaintiff's husband, it was held that she could not recover
because defendant's act was not directed against her. See also Nieberg v.
Cohen, 88 Vt. 281, 92 Ati. 214 (1914).
33 Actions for alientation of affection and criminal conversation have been
abolished, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 61a-d.
34 See Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204 (1915).
35 Commercial Carriers v. Small, 277 Ky. 189, 126 S. W. (2d) 143, 146
(1939).
36 Ibid.
37 Haynes v. Knowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N. E. 389 (1891) ; Kelley v. N. Y.
R. R., 168 Mass. 308, 46 N. E. 1063 (1897) ; Holleman v. Harvard, 119 N. C.
[ VOL. 14
NOTES AND COMMENT
ever, that the injuries to the wife are remote and "consequential" and
so cannot be compensated for within the ordinary rule of damages.
8
The same must certainly be true of the damages suffered by the hus-
band, unless his recovery is restricted to the monetary value of the
services which he has in fact lost, and there is a tendency to so re-
strict his recovery.39 The damages to a wife who lost the oppor-
tunity to bear children because of physical injuries to her husband
which resulted in his emasculation 40 cannot be any more remote than
the damages for which a husband recovers because a physician failed
to properly care for the wife during her confinement.41 Evidently
the public policy which caused the extension of the right of the hus-
band to sue (the protection of the right to conjugal love and society
to prevent the breakup of the marriage relationship) is today no longer
present.
The Enabling Acts have been interpreted in almost all jurisdic-
tions 42 as removing all the disabilities of coverture and allowing to
the wife all the remedies which her husband had. So that where the
courts recognized a right in the wife to the conjugal affection and
society of her husband, she was given a remedy for the intentional
interference therewith; 4 3 but the majority of the courts cannot find
a right in the wife which is damaged when the husband is negligently
injured. One reason is that the compensation received by the hus-
band is payment in full for the damages done and places the husband
in the position where he can care for his wife as well as before the
injury. But vigorous voices have been raised in protest against the
hardship and unfairness which results from the unequivocal dismis-
sal of such causes of action without regard to the merits of the case.44
In this respect the case of Bernhardt v. Perry 4' is to be noted, for in
the majority and dissenting opinions are set forth the opposing views
as to whether the Enabling Acts have given the wife the right to sue
for an unintentional interference with her marital rights. The ma-
150, 25 S. E. 972 (1896) ; Brown v. Brown, 124 N. C. 19, 32 S. E. 320 (1899) ;
Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N. C. 426, 102 S. E. 769 (1920); Sims v. Sims, 79
N. J. L. 577, 76 Atl. 1063 (1910) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E.
17 (1889); Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102 (1912);
Moberg v. Scott, 38 S. D. 422, 161 N. W. 998 (1917).
38 Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N. E. 860 (1933), supra
note 32.
31 Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724 (1915);
Schaupp v. Turner, 188 App. Div. 338, 177 N. Y. Supp. 132 (3d Dept. 1919)
(In an action by a husband to recover the value of his wife's services and the
expenses he was put to by reason of her being bitten by a vicious dog, it is
incumbent upon him to prove the damage he has suffered, and without such
proof he cannot recover).
40 Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N. Y. Supp. 534 (2d Dept.
1934), aff'd, 270 N. Y. 537, 200 N. E. 306 (1936).
41 Crooks v. Jonas, 204 N. C. 797, 169 S. E. 218 (1933).
42 Except Maine and Wisconsin; see note 31, supra.
43 See note 37, supra.
44 Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 608 (1938).
45276 Mo. 612, 208 S. W. 462 (1919).
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jority opinion bases its conclusion on the generally accepted premises
that the damages of the wife are too remote; that the damages which
the husband recovers are, in legal contemplation, not only supposed
to make him whole, but also enable him to discharge his marital
duties in the same degree as before the injury; and that the wife
would be recovering for injuries for which the husband had already
received compensation. It contends that it was not the intention of
the legislature to give a remedy where no rights had been interfered
with and where a double recovery would result; the legislature merely
intended to prevent the husband from reducing his wife's property to
possession and becoming the owner thereof. Chief Justice Bond, on
the other hand, proceeds upon the premise that even at common law
a personal right to enjoy the consortiuin of her husband was recog-
nized in the wife as one vested in her by the marital state, and that
the Enabling Acts, in addition to removing the disability to sue for
the loss thereof, have given her a property in her personal rights.
This dissenting opinion is favorably cited and followed in Hipp v.
E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Co.46 which has gone far to release the
wife from the feudal fetters of legal serfdom. Here the court recog-
nized a cause of action as being made out by the wife of a man negli-
gently injured by defendant, for personal injuries to herself which the
court summed up as follows: (1) expenses paid by her, made neces-
sary by her husband's injuries; (2) services performed in nursing and
caring for him; (3) loss of support and maintenance; (4) loss of
consortium; and (5) mental anguish. Such enumeration of plain-
tiff's injuries do not mean, however, that the court would compefisate
for each; 47 it does mean that the court recognizes a wrong for which
the wife is entitled to have her day in court.
Although the rights of the wife have been recognized as being
equal with those of the husband, her interest in the marital relation-
ship is not as fully protected as is his. Generally a distinction is made
between a wrong interfering with the marriage rights, which is inten-
tional and that which is unintentional. Where the wrong is uninten-
tionally inflicted the damages of the wife are said to be remote and
"consequential", for which no recovery may be had.48  Yet where a
husband is negligently injured his spouse suffers an independent loss
which is no less detrimental to the marriage relationship than is his.
The right to consortium not being a property right, but one incident
to the marriage relationship which will be protected only in certain
46 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318 (1921).
47 "While the wife cannot recover for any damages for which the husband
might have recovered * * * we think that she could recover for those injuries
which were sustained by her, for which the husband could not have recovered in
this action. * * * We will not go more fully into the elements of damages which
can be considered by the jury when the action goes back for a new trial."
Hipp v. Dupont, 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318, 322 (1921).
48 Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N. E. 860 (1933), supra
note 32.
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instances, 49 the courts are reluctant to allow the wife to sue for its
loss since the danger that is presented to the relationship is not so
great that negligent defendants should have the burden of paying ex-
cessive damages for the loss of something which is assumed by a jury.
The injustice, however, of summarily dismissing a complaint on the
ground that there is no authority to sustain it,50 is manifested by such
a situation as found in Hipp v. Dupont. The confusion arises from
the failure of the courts to uniformly examine the facts of these cases
to determine factually what the extent of the loss is and whether dam-
ages are recoverable .without making a farce of our trial system.
Public policy, as expressed in New York, has been to limit recovery
by the husband for loss of his wife's consortium 51 and to require him
to give proof of the value of his wife's services and the expenses to
which he was put.52 The danger of recovering excessive damages for
sentimental elements, the loss of which is assumed, having been re-
duced to a minimum there is absolutely no reason why the wife should
not be given her full, equal rights in the courts.
BERNARD SCHIFF.
FOREIGN LEGATEES AND DISTRIBUTEES UNDER SECTION 269 OF THE
SURROGATE'S COURT ACT.
"Where it shall appear that a legatee, distributee or beneficiary of
a trust would not have the benefit or use or control of the money or
other property due him, or where other special circumstances make it
appear desirable that such payment be withheld, the decree may direct
that such money or other property be paid into the Surrogate's court
for the benefit of such legatee, distributee, beneficiary of a trust or
such person or persons who may thereafter appear to be entitled
thereto * * *."
This is the 1939 addition to Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court
Act.' Appended to it was the following bill note: " * * * The pur-
pose of the amendment is to authorize the deposit of monies or prop-
erty in the Surrogate's Court in cases where transmission or payment
to a beneficiary, legatee, or other person resident in a foreign country
40 Colwell v. Tinker, 169 N. Y. 531, 536, 62 N. E. 668, 670 (1902), supra
note 11.GO Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 608 (1938), supra
note 44.51 N. Y. WORxMEN'S CoMPENsATIoN LAW § 11; Swan v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 129 Misc. 500, 222 N. Y. Supp. 111 (1927) (no recovery by a husband for
loss of his wife's services, when she is injured in the course of her employment
and has received compensation under Workmen's Compensation Law).
52 Schaupp v. Turner, 188 App. Div. 338, 177 N. Y. Supp. 132 (3d Dept.
1919), supra note 39.
2 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 343, in effect April 24, 1939.
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